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Policy Brief
by Hakim Asher
August 16, 2017

Unnecessary Timetables
In Afghanistan we need a tasktable not a timetable

From the earliest days of the counterterrorism war in Afghanistan, U.S. strategy has been sporadic and unsustained. President Bush’s “War on Terror” policy focused on dismantling al-Qaeda’s grip on Afghanistan and removing the Taliban from power, disrupting al-Qaeda’s global financial and political support networks, destroying al-Qaeda’s training camps, helping Afghans recover from the Taliban’s reign of terror and helping Afghans form a representative government to include all Afghans, including women. President Bush’s comprehensive policy against terrorism was intended to address those nations and regimes hostile to the U.S. that supported or harbored terrorism. After two presidential terms, however, President Bush’s grand strategy in Afghanistan achieved very little. While the international community led by the U.S. was advancing the counterterrorism campaign and trying to help Afghans participate in the advancement of their country and its development and political reform agendas, Pakistan was reorganizing aggressive insurgent groups including the Taliban and Haqqani network and providing them with sanctuaries, training, financing, and equipment.

In 2006, after a relatively peaceful period, the Taliban resurgence made strategic gains. President Obama’s “speedy withdrawal strategy” from Afghanistan made the situation even worse. These deadlines have given the notion to insurgent groups and their supporters in Pakistan to tactically advance their attacks across Afghanistan by strategically waiting and buying time. Instead of a timetable for troops in Afghanistan, I suggest establishing a tasktable that would tie troop numbers to specific tasks that need to be accomplished to ensure adequate security and stability in Afghanistan.

Uncertain and Underresourced

The war effort in Afghanistan has also been impaired by U.S. combat operations in Iraq and, subsequently, in Syria. Because of limitations in resources and manpower, the U.S. has not had the sustained and coherent strategy it needs to succeed in Afghanistan.

Create Attainable Political Goals

Simply putting more U.S. and coalition boots on the ground in Afghanistan will not help win the war; it could even exacerbate the situation. The U.S. needs a comprehensive, workable, and realistic strategy to end the war responsibly and definitively. The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan should have three pillars:

First, the U.S. should change its “nation-building” narrative. To achieve success in Afghanistan, nation-building must occur with minimal foreign presence and maximum local engagement. This effort should have an international face, with participation by the United Nations and other countries in the region, not with participation by the U.S. and NATO alone.

Second, the U.S. should continue to maintain a moderate number of troops in Afghanistan to focus on training, advising, and equipping the Afghan national security forces. The precise number of troops required can be determined using an iterative process, by regularly assessing needs on the ground. But more important than fixing an exact number of U.S. troops is the need to train the local population for self-sufficiency, so that Afghans themselves are able to manage their country and develop functional institutions. The Afghan people ultimately must have the largest stake in shaping and running their country.

In this effort, engaging prominent former resistance members to lead on the front lines against the Taliban, Haqqanis, al-Qaeda, Islamic State (Da’esh), and other terrorist groups can be an effective and viable strategy. These former resistance leaders are the only military force in Afghanistan who ideologically and politically opposed the Taliban and other insurgents, and they are the ones who defeated the Russians in the 1980s. They successfully resisted the Taliban in the 1990s and helped establish the American footprint in Afghanistan in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in 2001.

Third, the U.S. should form a combined military-diplomatic taskforce to initiate an open dialogue between Afghanistan-Pakistan and the U.S. in order to find a peaceful resolution to the war. Extremist groups continue to assemble and train within Pakistan s borders, and a sustained diplomatic engagement with Pakistan and other regional neighbors is essential for the resolution of fighting and cessation of terrorists attacks in Afghanistan, which continue to be on the rise.

The taskforce should be responsible for determining what the real concerns of Pakistan are, and try to address those concerns by finding ways to change Pakistan s strategic calculation or its “strategic depth” in Afghanistan. Changing Pakistan s strategic calculation may be a difficult task, but it is not impossible. Pakistan has not yet declared its concerns in Afghanistan openly; a diplomatic engagement from both sides is necessary. The Afghan government must be encouraged to solve its disputes with Pakistan.

Support Institutions Not Individuals

The U.S. has for too long lent its support to individuals within the Afghan political landscape instead of supporting institutions. This has created internal divisions and political strife. Promoting institutions of democratic self-governance and civil society goes further in creating a stable Afghanistan. The current political in-fighting that complicated efforts to protect Afghan civilians from terrorist attacks can also be reduced if the country’s institutions are healthy and robust.

Military Taskforce Structure

To win the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. must establish an authoritative military taskforce to lead  “command and control” functions. The central headquarters must be stationed in Kabul and should consist of (1) the Afghan Minister of Defense, (2) the Afghan Minister of the Interior, (3) the Afghan Director of Intelligence, (4) the Commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and (5) the CIA representative in Afghanistan.

This command and control taskforce should divide Afghanistan into seven regional combat zones. Based on current security threats, each zone should consist of a specific number of provinces. Each zone must be led by (1) the Afghan commander of the zone, (2) the provincial governors, (3) the chief of police, (4) the commander of the corps, and (5) the command of U.S. forces in that zone.

The central headquarters should be responsible for command and control of all combat missions across Afghanistan, but it should also delegate full responsibility for day-to-day operations to each of the regional combat zones in leading counter-insurgency efforts. The headquarters must also make sure to provide all resources necessary to the regional zones to fully equip them in the fight against extremists and the insurgency.

The central headquarters should report to the national security council led by President Ghani and CEO Abdullah. President Ghani, CEO Abdullah, and the national security council should have a supervisory role over strategy but should not interfere in the day-to-day military operations of each regional combat zone.

It is important to engage former resistance figures (e.g., Atta Noor, the Governor of Balkh, and other influential senior members of Afghan s political landscape) because this type of inclusion in decision-making processes is not only a peacebuilding gesture, it also ensures that these leaders cannot jeopardize the joint efforts of the Afghan government and the U.S.-led coalition in the war against the insurgency.

Create a Diplomatic Taskforce

Considering the current realities—including the fact that many al-Qaeda, Haqqani, Taliban, and most recently Islamic State (Da’esh) bases are actually in Pakistan—the U.S. must establish a taskforce consisting of senior officials from the U.S. State Department; the Afghan government (President, CEO, and the national security council); representatives from NATO and the UN; and regional countries including China, Russia, India, and central Asian countries to (1) open a diplomatic channel with Pakistan, and (2) engage Pakistan to stop supporting insurgent groups and close their sanctuaries and training camps on Pakistani soil.

In the last 16 years, since the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan began, Pakistan has been playing a friend-foe game, providing terrorist and insurgent groups safe havens inside their territory and using them as political tools to achieve their strategic goals in Afghanistan. At the same time, they receive millions from the U.S. each year in the name of countering terrorism. The only realistic strategy to change Pakistan s strategic calculations is by making strategic gains on the battlefield and encouraging (through incentives) or pressuring Pakistan, if needed, in the diplomatic arena.

Focus on Political and Government Reforms

Because the war in Afghanistan cannot be won solely militarily, we must also focus on long-term political and government reforms. These reforms include greater inclusion for all ethnic and minority groups, allowing for peaceful expression of political dissent, ensuring that the government is responsive to the ordinary people of Afghanistan, promoting economic self-sufficiency, and elimination of the illicit opium trade. The upcoming elections in 2019 are critical to the future of Afghanistan. Stabilizing the country prior to these elections can ensure successful elections and the health of democratic institutions.

Conclusion

To help Afghanistan, the U.S. and other international allies must engage over the long term on not just the military battlefield, but also through civilian engagement and regional diplomacy with Pakistan and other neighbors. There are many avenues for transforming two decades of war into a national blueprint that is viable and effective.

Through collaboration between U.S.-led international forces and Afghan security forces that is coordinated by a central authority of Afghan and U.S. leaders, the current instability can decrease as Afghan forces build capacity and eventually take over completely from their U.S. and coalition counterparts. The withdrawal of these U.S. forces can be based on a well-defined tasktable, which lists specific tasks related to stabilization, so troops can withdraw pending successful accomplishment of each task.

This brief was prepared by Hakim Asher, a former Research Fellow at George Washington University and American University, with the assistance of Taehee Kim, a graduate student at George Mason University. Mr. Asher received a Masters degree in International Public Policy from the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University and is currently a public policy expert. He was formerly the Executive Director of the Government Media and Information Center, Office of the President of Afghanistan.