Ending the War

ENDING THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

• During the course of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, some U.S. servicemembers like Special Forces captain Dan Quinn, Sgt. Charles Martland, and Lance Corporal Gregory Buckley, Jr. (deceased) courageously tried to speak out about the abuse of young boys by powerful Afghans during the war.
• They faced discrimination, retaliation, lack of response from Washington, and even in some cases dismissal from the military for attempting to report these abuses. See https://www.nytimes.com/…/us-soldiers-told-to-ignore-afghan….
• The sensitive (and literally explosive) topic of widespread abuse of young boys by powerful Afghans should be remedied in order to reach a peaceful resolution for the War in Afghanistan.
• The presence of and excessive reliance on secret intelligence in Afghanistan (American, Pakistani, Russian, Iranian) strikes me as a counterproductive and harmful impediment to lasting peace in the country, not a solution for “winning the war.”
• I am grateful to Gen. Paul Eaton, a respected U.S. military thinker, for his attentiveness to a situation costing American lives. In a recent NYT article, he suggests that Afghanistan needs to transition from military solutions to political ones.
• This view strikes me as off target because democratic elections in Afghanistan did not take into account the specific cultural and geographical idiosyncrasies of the country and instead sought a “one-size-fits-all” approach to Afghan democracy.
• Hakim Asher, an expert on Afghan political science, has stated that Afghanistan requires “an Afghan-style democracy,” customized to fit the country’s unique and particular characteristics.
• Mr. Asher volunteered to contribute a policy brief to the White House in August 2017, and portions of his outstanding work (attached) was echoed in many parts of Pres. Trump’s first speech on Afghanistan at Fort Myer.
• Threatened by the Taliban in his home country, Mr. Asher was seeking asylum in the U.S. but instead moved to Canada because the processing of his asylum application was too slow. The U.S. thus lost a skilled and knowledgeable expert on Afghanistan at a critical moment in the Trump administration.
• General Eaton’s suggestion that Afghanistan needs to move from military solutions to a political one does not take into account the potentially disruptive and destabilizing aspects of political violence.
• What Afghanistan needs more than a shift from military solutions to political ones might be regional, national, and local efforts to promote violence reduction.
• Violence reduction requires maybe truth and reconciliation to resolve grievances from wartime; diplomatic resolutions between the Taliban and the central government; ongoing diplomatic negotiations between surrounding regional actors; and secure border control.
• The New York Times article from late July 2018 refers to a “political opportunity to work with the Taliban.” I believe this term makes no sense because the Taliban does not view itself as a political organization, but as a religious one.
• To enhance the possibility of success in outlying provincial areas, it may be beneficial to explore an idea conceived by Mr. Hakim Asher when he served as head of communications for President Karzai. Mr. Asher promoted what he called “traditional communications” that would allow the people of outlying areas to be connected to the directives and priorities of the central government.
• This type of communication could allow the people of outlying areas to be connected to the directives and priorities of the central government. DO NOT use this idea or attempt this approach without consulting with Mr. Asher and several Afghan experts from both Kabul and the outlying provinces first.
• I believe “traditional communications” meant distributing press releases and announcements to local imams and respected religious leaders in villages in outlying provincial districts.
• The religious leaders would disseminate the information to villagers who might be functionally illiterate and thus not receiving accurate news from the central government.
• U.S. commanders and D.C. policymakers might benefit from carefully reviewing all reports from the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, known as SIGAR.
• SIGAR reports may assist in developing thoughts and ideas on how to shift away from war and toward peacetime operations in Afghanistan.
• To preserve safety in outlying areas of Afghanistan, it might work to establish accurate and quick reaction communications linking each of the provincial councils in remote areas of Afghanistan with (1) the central government in Kabul, (2) U.S. command in Afghanistan and Washington, and (3) nearby Afghan security forces who have been trained by U.S. forces.
• A message from U.S. command that can help sustain and support these provincial councils as they face new challenges might be: “Please call us right away if you need us. You are doing very well. We can work together well to stop the fighting in Afghanistan.”
• Please note the distinction between Afghan security forces and Afghan police. The police in Afghanistan should NOT be seen as a substitute for the Afghan security forces or for U.S. forces. Local police do not have the same training, rigor, or purpose as Afghan or U.S./NATO security forces.
• A number of Afghan police who received support from the U.S. during the war were reported to have engaged in extreme forms of child abuse and other forms of victimization and exploitation.
• Some Afghans even came to view the Taliban favorably because they believed that the Taliban were opposed to the types of sadistic abuse that some powerful Afghans who were allied with the U.S. earlier in the war were reported to have committed.
• “Strategy for retreat” is not the operative term that should be used. Maybe “strategy for positive engagement.” Bearing in mind the following “Three ‘Ts’” may be useful:

1. Translators (incorporate military and legal protections from possible retributive violence against translators, their families, and other Afghans who worked with the U.S. into any and all future Afghan peace talks),
2. Trade (avoiding any form of exploitation or excessive profitmaking), and
3. Troop reduction (bring home 2,000 U.S. troops considered non-essential to combat operations by Christmas time. This step will require careful determination of which troops can be safely replaced by Afghan security forces. Consultation with experienced Afghan security commanders and translators seems necessary. As they return home, Americans who served in Afghanistan can, if able and willing, continue to serve by remaining in contact with their colleagues and their Afghan counterparts still in the field through daily communications. If there are concerns about safety and security, their input should be heard and valued by military commanders and the situation on the ground in Afghanistan should be diligently monitored by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Forces Committee, as well as the Senate Intelligence Committee).